as a tool in the policy of 'separate development' aimed at restructuring the socio-political system [Bell 1973a] , while the second considers it, together with other key aspects of separate development such as 'homelands', as providing no more than an intellectual disguise for a policy which is designed to maintain White economic power based on the control of resources, notably abundant supplies of cheap labour [Legassick and Wolpe 1976] .
It is my contention that South Africa since 1948
can be analysed in a realistic way only by referring to the driving forces behind Afrikaner nationalism. The party which came to power in that ,year was motivated by three forces. First, the determination that never again should the Afrikaner be ruled by others. Since 'others' would be most probably African nationalists, this meant, second, that racial segregation was regarded as necessary in the sociopolitical sphere. The third force was an economic one, ie the conversion of the Afrikaner's position of economic inferiority to one of equality with English-speaking Whites. Although some useful insights are contributed by proponents of the second view, my experience of the Afrikaner nationalist convinces me that the first approach is more appropriate. Historical, psychological, racial and economic factors have all influenced the actions of the National Party (NP) in power. The theoretical framework of separate development, formulated from the early l940s, was inspired by visions of Afrikaner political domination and of racial segregation rather than by visions of Afrikaner economic prosperity [de Klerk, 1976: ch 9] . The 'Afrikaner-English' economic gap has to a large extent been diminished thanks to the NPs use of political power for the purpose of gaining economic power. There has been some dilution of racial segregation, although not of a fundamental nature. But the continued predominance of the first driving force, Afrikaner nationalist political power, is illustrated by the proposed new constitution which in effect guarantees NP (as opposed to White) rule in the 'common area'1 of South Africa (CASA). 
Decentralisation -Theory and Policy
The policy instruments adopted to encourage decentralisation, and the results achieved, are broadly similar to those of other countries which have attempted to disperse industry. Decentralisation programmes in most countries date back only since the war and have had no well-developed body of economic theory on which to draw; the interest of economists in the spatial distribution of economic activity is only a comparatively recent one and regional economic theory is at present in a state of disarray [Friedmann, 1979] .
Regional theory draws on location theory. But when location theory and the available empirical evidence on location decisions are distilled, only three useful points emerge. These are: i) the differences between locality-bound and footloose industries; ii) the strong influence of agglomeration economies; and iii) the importance in decisionmaking of the personal (and often subjective) preferences of entrepreneurs. Thus industrial decentralisation is likely to be most successful in those regions possessing a raw material base and/or a market potential, able to develop agglomeration economies at the growth centre(s), and able to create an attractive living environment.
Yet these may not be sufficient conditions for the success of growth centres, the concept on which most mixed economies have based their decentralisation efforts. The idea behind this concept is that government will provide the physical infrastructure (serviced industrial estates) and financial incentives (investment subsidies, tax concessions and so on) in the hope that these will attract private investment on a scale sufficient ultimately to provide conditions of self-generating growth without such aid. However, accumulated experience over the years has shown the growth centre concept to have a 2 Industrial decentralisation and homeland development are discussed in greater detail by the author in R. Schrire (ed), South A second, and related, factor is that the success of growth centre strategy depends on the designation of only a few growth centres and the recognition of those centres for a considerable period [Richardson 19711 . In South Africa the failure of border areas to generate economic activity in the homelands led to the designation of growth points in the homelands, while unemployment among Coloureds and Indians also lead to the creation of growth points for these two groups. Thus, rather than concentrating on the most favourable areas, the decentralisation effort has been scattered -21 growth points by 1975 and financial assistance available in over 50 other towns! Within 10 years the three most successful growth points had been deproclaimed; the necessity to promote 'homeland' development may well lead the government to deproclaim other centres prematurely.
Third, as has been the case in Western Europe, the government has found it necessary to offer increasingly generous concessions, augmenting them on no less than five occasions since 1960.
Fourth, government provision of physical infrastructure and financial incentives does not mean First, on the assumption that the homelands are separate political entities, the South African Government has prepared a National Physical Development Plan (NPDP) which covers regional development in CASA. Identified in the NPDP are potential metropolitan regions and a number of growth points with existing or potential locational advantages over the homelands. Although some homelands -Kwazulu, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana -impinge upon metropolitan regions and large towns in CASA and would not necessarily be at a serious locational disadvantage, the growth points selected are largely in remote areas of these homelands. Moreover, the homelands have to compete with CASA in the incentives offered to industry. Thus, for instance, homeland administrations have tended to waive the 'agency basis' whereby investors were to be obliged to transfer ownership to local concerns after 25 years. The problem is that the periphery has to bargain with investors who have a wide range of locations from which to choose.
Second, the BLS countries are part of the Southern African Customs Union which provides for a free flow of goods and for the protection of infant industries against South African products -the latter clause, incidently, not being applied to the independent homelands [Leistner 1977 ]. These three countries are all trying to industrialise.
Industries wishing to produce for markets in the rest of Africa (and the Third World) as well as the customs union would, for political reasons, find better locations than the homelands. In practice, however, such firms are likely to be South African rather than transnational, and BLS have thus far attracted relatively few such enterprises, largely because the risk perceptions are unfavourable [Selwyn 1975 ].
The Impact of Decentralisation
What then have been the results of the decentralisation policy? It has been argued that three points must be proved if such a policy is to be regarded as successful [Cohen 1978] .
That the policy stopped the metropolitan Assuming that the share would have remained constant at 11.8 per cent in the absence of a decentralisation policy [Bell 1973b ] only the increase (amounting to 11,600 jobs) may be attributed to the policy. Thus of 87,000 jobs created (for all races) in the growth points during this period, 75,400 would have been created anyway.
That the investment resulting from the policy resulted in a genuine dispersal as opposed to a suburbanisation of industry. The most successful growth points of the l960s -Pietermaritzburg, Hammarsdale and Rosslyn -represented the latter, being essentially an outward extension of the Durban and PWV metropolitan regions.
Whether or not the policy has been 'successful' according to these three criteria, it is clear that employment creation in the growth points has been slow. Data for 1970-76 suggest even slower progress; by 1970 there were 61,500 Africans in decentralised industries as against 82,100 in 1976 [South Africa 1977 Benso 1978] . The increase seems low, but of course economic growth slackened off in the l970s.
The success or failure of South African decentralisation policy must be judged against the theoretical foundations of growth centre doctrine as well as against the aims of the government's separate development policy which it was introduced to serve. A recent study concludes that the growth centre concept has failed as a tool of regional development [Friedmann 1979 
